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Abstract  
 This paper studies the humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories, focusing on 
the Palestinians’ short-term needs in emergency relief as well as their long-term needs regarding 
sustainable development, good governance, legal and physical protection. Against the backdrop of a 
cost/benefit analysis of the current UN humanitarian operational model, the paper then introduces 
new models of engagement, such the UN’s positioning itself as a mediator between the PA and the 
civic society throughout the implementation of a decentralized development model. Within this 
framework, the UN is advised to complement its engagement by facilitating negotiations towards a 
unified Palestinian government that incorporates the PA’s expertise in engaging the global political 
platform with the civic-based authority Hamas has within Palestine. The paper also proposes that the 
UN deploy a peace-keeping mission to help reduce the rate at which Israeli authorities and extremist 
settlers are pursuing a coercive environment in the WBGS. The last section of the essay highlights a 
reconceptualized diplomatic negotiation process spearheaded by the UN that complements its 
domestic operations. This reform essentially involves the expansion of the UN agenda to leverage the 
strategic partnerships the Gulf States, China, and Japan have with Israel and Palestine, as well as 
their financial powers to help sustain a viable Palestine until a settlement is reached.  
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Introduction  
Focus of the Study  
Since Israel’s independence in 1948, the UN has spearheaded the Middle East Peace Process 
[MEPP] to reach a settlement acceptable to both the state of Israel and the Palestinian state. 
Unfortunately, taking the most commonly accepted 1967 agreement as the basis for its operations, 
the UN has failed to implement his vision to establish lawful and just peace where two states co-exist 
with minimal tension. Rather, the Gaza Strip [GS] is under Israeli and Egyptian military blockade 
since 2007, severely restricting the movement of natural resources, goods and services, which in turn 
has created an emergent need for energy, clean water, and adequate medical attention. Further, the 
development model the UN has followed in Gaza has failed to build its infrastructure, especially in 
the face of the inflicted damage by the recurrent hostilities between Hamas and Israel’s security 
forces. Comparably, the West Bank [WB] has been under Israeli occupation since the 1967 war. 
Under a discriminatory policy imposed on the territories in the West Bank and more recently in East 
Jerusalem [WBEJ], Israel is expanding its settlements by creating a coercive environment driven by 
settler extremism, evictions and demolitions, confiscation of Palestinian land for military purposes 
and its rezoning for Israeli economic growth, and freedom of movement imposed on Palestinians 
living near Israeli settlements. While the oPt receives frequent attention by global news agencies and 
humanitarian NGOs, the diplomatic process has come to a halt amidst the emerging wars and violent 
conflicts in the greater Middle East. Meanwhile, the welfare of Palestinians is at a rapid decline, 
making an eventual 2-state solution unviable should the negotiations ever proceed to that phase.  
So, in light of the ineffective development models, the stagnated diplomatic process, and the 
distrust surrounding the neutrality of the conventional UN member states – the US and the EU - 
engaged in the occupied Palestinian territories [oPt], this essay asks the question, “what are the 
reconceptualized humanitarian strategies and diplomatic actors that the UN can embrace to help 
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sustain the Palestinian populations in the occupied Palestinian territories [oPt] throughout until the 
Middle East Peace Process is settled?”   
Literature Review 
In the UN Country Team Mission in the oPt July 2017 Report delineating Gaza’s de-
development process in the last 10 years in areas of economic growth, infrastructure, basic social 
services like education and health, protection, and the preservation of human rights. After laying out 
the facts, it provides 3 essential drivers of the humanitarian crisis: the internal Palestinian divide 
between the West Bank and Gaza propagated by the disagreements between Fatah and Hamas; the 
Israeli closures be it in the form of blockades, checkpoints, or demolitions; and recurrent hostilities 
between the Israeli Defense Forces [IDF] and Hamas. Given the pace at which the conditions in the 
oPt change, this report is crucial to guaranteeing that an assumed reality checks out. Further, the 
reports published by the Office for Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA] from 2017 and the 
first few months complement the findings of the report, making it a credible source as foundation on 
which the essay builds its arguments.  
With regards to the UN humanitarianism, Anne Le More’s Killing with Kindness is a 
bold scholarly article delimitating the process by which a development-focused UN engagement 
in Palestine shifted to a narrative of humanitarian aid in response emerging humanitarianism and 
evolving donor preferences. While 4 of the 5 interviews conducted has supported this argument, 
Sohail Luka of the European Commission [EC] Humanitarian Aid commission has stated that 
only around 5% of the EU’s operations focus on aid (Personal Encounter 27 February 2018), a 
large margin that challenges the theoretical position Le More takes in her piece. Still, 2 sources 
of peer-reviewed literature found in this essay further describe how the humanitarian frame in 
Palestine has damaged the socio-political setting. It is possible that while Luka emphasized the 
most recent quantitative dimension of the operations, the scholars are emphasizing the narrative 
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surrounding the UN involvement in the oPt that has been shaped since 1967. Another gap in 
knowledge this paper encounters with Le More is that she does not introduce any solutions that 
will address the problem she has described. So, to bridge that gap, Ben-Meir’s Development 
through Decentralization is utilized. In this publication, a highly specialized mode of 
development is brought to the reader’s attention, and its benefits to oPt are well-balanced with its 
potential costs. However, this paper posits that Ben-Meir’s model is viable only with a unified 
Hamas-Fatah government; Palestine’s history of corruption, authoritarianism, and political 
fragmentation makes it unlikely for the model to be self-sustainable under 2 modes of 
government.  
In the last section, one main article the essay takes use of is Yakov Rabkin’s piece on  
analysis regarding the payoffs of positioning China, Russia, and India as mediators of the MEPP. 
This publication is perhaps one of the most important sources to this paper, because its argument 
is one that has often been dismissed by the parties involved in the conflict who historically 
engaged in the Middle East. Further, the Baker Institute’s piece on the Israel/Palestine conflict 
and the Gulf States makes the idea that it is time for non-US, non-EU member states to the UN to 
take over the MEPP more credible.   
Research Methodology  
To answer the research question and achieve its objectives, the project capitalizes on both 
primary and secondary sources of data. With regards to the former, the essay uses reports by the 
Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [OCHA], by the World Health Organization 
[WHO], by Human Rights Watch [HRW], to describe the objective facts on the ground in the 
WBGS. It also uses UN Security Council [UNSC] and General Assembly [GA] Resolutions, articles 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the UN Charter, and the BADIL Resource Center’s report on 
Operation Cast Edge when discussing the effectiveness of international law enforcement in 
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mitigating the violations of IHL and IHRL. A second source of primary resources is formal and 
informal interviews with 5 experts on the subject chosen depending on their personal and academic 
relevance, as well as the potential level of discretion surrounding the interview. When conducting the 
interviews, the project has put great effort into the ethical considerations that are necessary in the 
creation of credible research. As such, in each of the interviews, the student conducting the interview 
has explained that the interviewee had a right to anonymity, to refuse any/all of the questions, to 
terminate the interview at any point, and to keep any/all of the sensitive information and/or names 
confidential. The student has also clarified in all interviews that the answers are not reflective of the 
organizations with which the interviewees are associated. Complementarily, all quotes in the essay 
that are used in reference to an interviewee are approved beforehand by their corresponding expert.    
The secondary sources of research in this project are twofold. On the one hand, it uses 
scholarly articles and peer-reviewed literature to gather different perspectives on how to approach the 
Palestinian crisis both in the short term in responding to the humanitarian crisis, and in the long-term 
when developing a viable Palestinian state. On the other hand, the essay draws on several news 
published within the last 10 months by credible news outlets to evaluate whether the arguments and 
predictions laid out by scholars still hold or have lost their weight given the rapidly changing 
conditions on the ground. While the majority of the data is qualitative, the essay also displays 
quantitative data on the conditions in the WBGS to demonstrate the gravity of the situation on hand.  
Definitions and the Theoretical/Analytical Framework  
To clarify the abbreviations and the definitions that will be used in this essay, “Palestine” 
refers to the historic Palestinian territories drawn by the 1967 De Facto Line. As such, a “Palestinian” 
is an individual both within and beyond the Green Line who identifies as a Palestinian. However, 
given its regional focus, the proposed strategies related to domestic civic development and foreign 
diplomatic engagement will refer to the Palestinian populations in Israel and Palestine, and will 
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exclude the migrants and refugees outside the two territories. Building on this premise, oPt 
encompasses the following three regions. First, following the Fourth Geneva Convention and the UN 
Charter, the IC considers the West Bank as divided into Areas A, B, C by the 1995 Oslo Accords 
under illegal Israeli occupation since 1967. Secondly, acknowledging the UN decision to make 
Jerusalem an international protectorate until a peace resolution is reached, this paper considers East 
Jerusalem to be under Israeli occupation since the 1967 war. Thirdly, although Israel has unilaterally 
disengaged from Gaza in 2005 and withdrew all of its settlements, this paper judges the Strip to be 
under continuous military occupation given the effective control Israel retains over Gaza’s borders, 
as well as its land, maritime, and air space. Although the Golan Heights are also under Israeli 
occupation both in terms of military control and settlement expansion, they belong to Syria under 
international law, and thus are excluded from discussion. For full disclosure, this essay accepts the 2-
state model as the solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict. However, the focus of this essay is not to 
discuss the validity of the two opposing frameworks. Rather, the project studies the ongoing 
humanitarian crisis in the oPt and introduces more effective strategies that will help sustain 
Palestinians so that a 2-state solution is still a viable option if/when negotiations are reintroduced.  
In the initial section, this essay analyzes the IC’s humanitarianism in the oPt since the 
Oslo Accords. Humanitarianism in this context is the practice of providing assistance to 
populations, non-state actors [NSAs] and governments in need of economic, political, military or 
human rights support. From a theoretical standpoint, the state is driven by an altruist, moral 
obligation to contribute to universal human welfare. By contrast, it is widely argued that 
humanitarianism in practice is influenced by domestic policy restraints, power politics, and 
spheres of influence. Then, the essay highlights two distinct types of humanitarianism: 
humanitarian aid and development. Building on a cost-benefit analysis of relief and emergency 
assistance in the oPt, it strategies an international engagement framework that moves away from 
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the former and into the latter. For the purposes of this essay, humanitarianism in on itself is 
considered to be a legitimate commitment to Palestinian welfare, and the ethical conversations 
around the issue are excluded.  
When discussing the different developmental methods available to Palestinians, the essay 
refers to two concepts. As a political development model, constitutionalism refers to efforts to 
prevent an arbitrary government by building good governance, rule of law, and independent 
judiciary, and effective law enforcement. In this essay, an ideological adherence to 
constitutionalism forms the basis for the analyses of Palestinian civic society and of political 
capacity-building measures. Complementarily, as a social development model, decentralized 
development refers to the transfer of the government’s central socio-economic responsibilities to 
local communities within its territory, allowing each to follow regional, semi-autonomous 
development models and pursue independent partnerships depending on their specific needs 
(Ben-Meir 2009:1).  
The second section of the essay discusses diplomacy in the MEPP. It uses geopolitics, an 
analytical framework studying the interactions between the geographic spaces between and the 
political processes of entities – both state and non-state – that influence intra- and inter-state 
relations (Csurgai Geopolitical Analysis lecture 2018). Within this context, the essay uses 
internal geopolitics to analyze the national policies of Israel, the PA, and Hamas independent of 
their relations with other foreign states to understands their priorities abroad. Complementarily, 
through external geopolitics, the essay utilizes 
- Macro regional analysis to understand Egypt and Jordan’s partnerships with Israel and 
Palestine; 
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- Continental analysis of the Middle East and North Africa [MENA] region to calculate the 
sustainability of bringing the Gulf States into the equation; 
- Global analysis to broaden the IC’s conflict resolution scope to emerging powers such as 
China and India; 
Throughout these evaluations, the essay takes away from geopolitical factors relating to  
- Natural resources – specifically oil, gas, and rare earth materials; 
- Geography of populations – Israeli, Palestinian, Jewish, Muslim, and Christian identities 
as they relate to the ideological platforms of the aforementioned foreign powers; 
- Economic factors – Israel’s technology and innovation techniques in aviation, Israel’s 
relative industrial growth, relative self-sufficiency levels of Palestine and Israel in energy 
and water, Israel’s export industry in military equipment and weaponry, external states’ 
potential investment plans in Israel, Palestine, and MENA, and global trade relations; 
- Strategy of actors – the interplay between foreign powers’ short-term and long-term 
policies in MENA, the policy preferences of the states with soft power in the IC, and the 
influence of public opinion in the external states’ foreign policy considerations.  
By doing so, the essay judges the actors who can play a strategic role in the MEPP, as well as 
specifying the particular responsibilities the chosen actors should take on to guarantee a more 
promising diplomatic model. In relation to the economic factors, this essay also uses a 
geoeconomic framework to highlight the non-violent, financial strategies Palestine can employ to 
protect its economy and its strategic agricultural sector, to help its local businesses acquire shares 
of the Palestinian market without being overpowered by cheaper imports from Israel and China. 
Complementarily, the concept of power projection – using one’s economic power to drive 
foreign policy by means of soft power (Csurgai geoeconomics lecture 2018) – is touched upon 
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when discussing the potential means of entry of China, Japan, and India into the Middle East 
platform.  
The Analysis 
The Conditions on the Ground in the Gaza Strip  
Since the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007, Israel has maintained a military blockade 
around the city as a security precaution, creating a humanitarian crisis that revolves around 3 
urgent areas. The recurrent rounds of hostilities in 2002, 2006, and 2014 have made existential 
blows to the oPt’s infrastructure, leading on the one hand to chronic energy shortages.i The city 
is relying on back-up generators, which are “constantly at risk due to funding shortages for fuel, 
limited fuel storage capacity, recurrent malfunctioning due to overuse, and challenges in 
procuring spare parts and new generators due to import restrictions” (UN Country Team 
2018:22). Most often, the Gazans experience daily blackouts that last around 20 hours(18). These 
shortages in turn are affecting the water treatment and health facilities. Given the short energy 
supply, only 2 of the 2 desalination facilities are working, producing 3-4 million cubic meters 
[MCM] water total in addition to the 55-60 MCM produced by the main water source in Gaza. 
(Reuteurs 2017) Unfortunately, not only is the current demand 200 MCM, but the water aquifer 
is contaminated by chemicals, seawater, and the sewage, making it 96.5% unusable (Reuteurs 
2017). As a result, as of January 201, “50% of the population receive[d] water for only 8 hours 
every 4 days … [while only] 20% receive[d] water for 8 hours every 2 days.” (UN Country 
Team 2017:20). To improve their conditions, the Gazans have begun to rely on water trucks, 
which are more expensive, less regulated, and unreliable due to unscheduled roadblocks (20). 
The population has also crafted homemade wells and techniques to desalinate water, but the 
blockade makes it highly difficult to build institutional capacity to provide clean, affordable 
waterii. Without effective desalination facilities, the contaminated water supply is increasing the 
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risks of waterborne diseases, and thus outbreaks. Further, not only are the energy cuts life 
threatening for certain patients, but also, the subsequent disruptions in electricity are making it 
impossible for physicians to depend on uninterrupted cold chains, which is leading to failed 
immunization programs (UN Country Team 2017:22). As for the healthcare infrastructure, the 
Israeli closures of hospitals and health facilities, as well as the restrictions on the movements of 
drugs are depleting Gazan healthcare from 40% of its resources and affecting as many as 1.27 
million people (WHO 2018). To make matters worse, the restrictions in the movement of 
patients out of the Strip into the WB, where healthcare is better, is making access to treatment 
extremely challengingiii  
Much like healthcare, the blockade denies the provision of other basic social services like 
education. Given the increases in the literacy rate and the average years of schooling (UN 
Country Team 2018:24), it may seem at first glance like education has not been gravely affected 
by the crisis. Nonetheless, the issue at hand is the inability of the educational sector to find a 
stable footing. As of the end of 2017, 61.7% of the government schools and 70.4% of the 
UNRWA schools has worked on a double-shift system in which only 4 hours a day have been 
reserved to learning (24). Further, the lack of a regular budget, as well as the diversion of 
international funding to rebuilding the schools damaged by the hostilities and Israeli shelling, 
means that teacher go unpaid for months (24). Complementarily, the restrictions on travel 
prevent the IC from training teachers and globalizing the education system in Gaza, which makes 
a self-sustaining service industry only that much harder. In fact, although “Gaza has one of the 
youngest populations in the world, with 43% below the age of 15”, the youth in Gaza are 
marginalized in the job sector, have limited access to socio-cultural facilities, and drop out early 
for protection and income (17). Given that proper education and professional skill development 
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can increase participation in the Palestinian labor market and benefit Palestinian economy, 
inadequate education is detrimental not just to learning basic math, but also to the structural 
integrity of the Palestinian society.  
The Conditions on the Ground in the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
The condition on the ground in the WBEJ described in the simplest sense is a 2-tiered system 
that legislatively, executively, and judicially favors Israeli populations over their Palestinian 
counterparts in order to expand Israeli settlements in areas designated under international law as 
Palestinian territory. This highly organized framework proceeds under strategies that have since 1967 
become ingrained in the governance structure of WBEJ. Firstly, there exists severe restrictions of 
movement. Following a wave of attacks by Palestinians across the border in 2002, Israel began to 
build a separation wall, “85% of which falls within the West Bank rather than along the GL… cutting 
off Palestinians from agricultural lands and isolating 11,000 Palestinians on the Western side … who 
must cross the barrier to access their own property” (OCHA Increase in Settler Violence 2017). 
Similarly, the Fence around the 2 neighborhoods in Hebron City separates 1800 Palestinians from the 
rest of the H2 area Israel has installed two access checkpoints around and access restrictions within 
the fenceiv. Then, in January 2018, arguing that Palestinian children threw stones at Israeli vehicles 
travelling down the road, Israel blocked 3 access roads going into the Hizma Village to Palestinian 
traffic (OCHA increase in settler violence 2017).  
Although they may seem like decisions driven by security policies, these infringements on 
the Palestinians’ freedom of movement are part of a systematic effort to fragment the oPt. The Wall 
in the WB demonstrates this agenda perfectly, as Palestinians need a permit to access the land 
between the GL and the Wall, which has a 55% approval rate Further, they need to coordinate at the 
gate through several bureaucratic stages to passage agricultural products such as fertilizers, seeds, 
and equipment (OCHA Impact of Barrier 2017). These conditions, when combined with random gate 
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schedules hurts the Palestinian agricultural productivityv. Concerning H2, the access checkpoints for 
Palestinians are subject to an unpredictable schedule, which feeds into the isolation of the 
communities within the fence who often choose not to go out for social activities for fear of getting 
stuck on the outside. More importantly, although the ICRC coordinates with Israel, injured 
Palestinians in need of urgent healthcare need to cross the gate or even go through alleyways to reach 
ambulances, which often cannot enter upon short notice. Relatedly, 600 children enrolled in schools 
outside the fence have to take longer routes (OCHA Further Restrictions 2017). Similarly, blocking 
road access into the Hizma Village, a strategic location near EJ, diverts the North-South traffic, 
harming the commercial life in Palestine, and making access to teachers, doctors, and food delivery 
more painstaking (OCHA Increase in settler violence 2017). Such realities decrease Palestinians’ 
welfare in the targeted regions, pushing them to leave their houses and lands for easier lives.  
A second crisis the WBEJ is experiencing is the expanding settlements. On a systematic 
level, the Israeli government is passing legislation like the Regularization Law in February 2017, 
which “allow Israel to retroactively expropriate Palestinian land on which settlements have been 
built” in East Jerusalem and Area C (OCHA increase in settler violence).  Subsequently, although 
Oslo requires that Israel stops all settlement activity, Israel is expanding into the WB at increasing 
ratesvi. By contrast, the Israeli governance makes it highly difficult, if not impossible, for Palestinians 
to obtain building permits, driving them to build unauthorized houses and businesses that are at 
constant risk of confiscation or worse, demolition. The crisis is even more existential now in 2018 
that the government has broadened the scope of its demolition policyvii, also complementing it with a 
coercive environment that pushes Palestinian communities out. These strategies involve arbitrary 
revoking of Palestinian residencies and evictions as retaliation for attacks on Israelis allegedly carried 
out by a family member in the house, lack of security provided by law enforcement to Palestinian 
residences,, restrictions on access to land and natural resources, and most significantly, the denial of 
basic public services (OCHA increase in settler violence 2017). In Area C, for example, as a result of 
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the demolitions, 40 of the 46 communities in Bedouin do not have access to a primary school within 
their neighborhoods, decreasing the overall quality of education and pushing them to drop-out early 
so that they do not face daily long distances, settler harassment, and searches at checkpoints (OCHA 
West Bank Demolitions 2018). Similarly, the security, administrative services, housing, education, 
and medical care Israel provides for about 607,000 in the WBEJ are less costly, more extensive, and 
more reliable than for their Palestinian counterparts (OCHA increase in settler violence 2017). 
Together, the housing laws and the low standard of living facilitates the rate at which Israeli settlers 
can acquire housing by erection or by purchase.  
Humanitarianism in the oPt 
Humanitarian engagement by the UN is divided into 3 distinct settings, with the work of the 
European Commission [EC] as the prevailing model due to the EU’s being the primary financial 
donor of humanitarian assistance in the WBGS. Two of these 3 areas have to do with aid –relief 
and development. The first is delivered by means of “allocating funds to non-governmental 
partners such as the UN agencies, UNICEF, UNHCR, OCHA, WHO, or international NGOs like 
Save the Children, IRC, or IGOs like the ICRC” (Luka Personal Encounter 27 February 2018). 
While relief aid is on a case-by-case, need basis, the development type aid is long-termed and is 
focused on building the Palestinian infrastructure mainly through the UNRWA. A trend in the 
distribution of these 2 types of assistance methods is that despite being neutral and independent in 
theory, and being driven by a purely moral concern, relief aid has had socio-political consequences 
on the ground, namely the prioritization of the symptoms of the conflict at the expense of addressing 
its root causes. Throughout the 20th century, mainly through the UN Conciliations Commission in 
Palestine [UNCCP] and the UN Relief and Works Agency [UNRWA], the UN was able to facilitate 
the socio-economic development of Palestine, build its institutions, upgrade its infrastructure, and 
improve the living standards in the territories by driving the pollical process forward through the 
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1948 and ‘67 plans. Nevertheless, the fact is that, since the dismantling of the UNCCP and the 
emerging crises in the rest of the Middle East, the UN has shifted in the 1990s to an emergency 
assistance model that prioritizes the immediate needs of Palestinians: it has framed the issue from a 
humanitarian crisis perspective, which has not only left the Palestinians without legal protection, but 
it has also put on the back burn their historical claims to statehood and political goals – taking away 
their agency and reducing them to victims in need of donor funds (Odeh personal encounter 19 April 
2018). When development did take place, it remained reactive and short-termed, as the UN put 
emphasis on emergency relief funds to address the intifada without listening to the Palestinian 
demands that were causing the intifadas to often reoccur; as a result, much of the progress the UN 
achieved in developing the infrastructure was destroyed with the next rounds of hostilities (Le More 
2005: 992). Further, it primarily addressed poverty, unemployment, and invested in labor-intensive 
projects (Lovatt Personal Encounter 8 March 2018), which reduced the funding going into building 
administrative capacity – rule of law, a democratic and responsive PA, and a constitutionalist 
government with a monopoly on institutional violence, able to enforce the law. Most recently, the 
UN’s primary attention is on responding to the described energy, water, and healthcare crisis in 
Gaza, and to the violence perpetuated against Palestinians in the WB. While these priorities are 
commendable in their efforts to alleviate the suffering of an entire population, they have also allowed 
the UN to let the MEPP lose momentum.  
The negative impact of the prioritization of humanitarian aid on the UN’s development 
efforts is seen by how little progress the IC has made in the last 10 years to change the course of 
the humanitarian crisis. For one, the redesigned Israeli demolition policy in Israel targets schools 
and hospitals funded and built by international donors and IGOs like the UNRWA, greatly 
undermining without consequence the structural changes they try to driveviii. Comparably, in 
Gaza, the focus on the reconstruction of buildings and roads damaged or destroyed in the 2014 
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conflict has taken attention away from its structural needs, playing a significant role in the lack 
of institutional capacity of Palestine to provide its populations with electricity, clean water, 
healthcare, and education. On an even more structural level, Gaza’s economy is still not on a 
self-sustainable path. For one, the share of the private sector in the Gazan economy is declining; 
the private firms in Gaza are “family-owned, family-operated, small with 1 to 4 workers, and are 
characterized by a low level of labor productivity, capital intensity, and technical efficiency” 
(UN Country Team 15). The IC has indeed spearheaded dozens of local projects targeting 
business and productive sectors to promote new jobs and expand the private network. However, 
when combined with limited access to raw materials, natural resources, and foreign markets, a 
weak infrastructure, and Gazan reluctance to invest in business, this case-by-case approach has 
had an entirely limited successix. Although the motivation behind prioritizing relief aid has merit, 
the damage it is causing in the long-term is undeniable, especially given its inability to fully 
realize its intended vision in the area. To demonstrate, one primary focus of humanitarian aid in 
oPT has been the return of displaced populations. As of July 2017, due to the restrictions on the 
imports of construction materials into Gaza, “only two thirds of the approximately $500 million 
needed for the reconstruction of totally destroyed homes have been disbursed” (OCHA Three 
Years On, 2017). Correspondingly, lack of funding has interrupted the distribution of 
“Temporary Shelter Cash Assistance [TSCA] … the primary form of assistance provided by the 
humanitarian community … enabling families to rent accommodation until their homes are 
reconstructed or rehabilitated” (OCHA Three Years On, 2017). Despite the warnings and the 
funding, Gaza is on a de-development trajectory that is progressing even faster than the UN has 
projected in both relief and development.x Clearly, the current aid framework is not working.   
Reforming Humanitarian Engagement in the oPt  
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In reconceptualizing its humanitarian approach, the UN needs to switch back its attention to 
sustainable, institutional growth. To do so, the UN can help the PA implement the decentralized 
development framework. From the get-go, this model will give decision-making processes to local 
communities and help engage them in their own faith by organizing town hall meetings. Further, a 
collaborative mission between the UN and the PA can help the civic society build administrative, 
financial, and technical skills so that they manage their own initiatives. One main argument against 
this project is that often governments are reluctant to give up power. However, a proper, gradual 
implementation requires constant coordination between the central governments of a region – in this 
case the PA and Hamas – and their corresponding neighborhoods: while the smaller villages build 
development, national governments are responsible for allocation of resources, the macroeconomic 
policy, the foreign policy, the judiciary, and other large-scale schemes (Ben-Meir 2009:3). 
Subsequently, both parties will have a stake in maintaining the quod-pro-quo system. The transition 
to a decentralized government is also feasible from a financial perspective, since even a 3-year long, 
extensive involvement on the part of the UN in training, funding, and providing expertise to the 
relevant agents will require only $500 dollars, compared to the $7 billion it has pledged to Palestine 
(Ben-Meir 2009:9). Also, a significant political side-effect decentralization carry is the facilitation of 
a reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, since a unified government would facilitate the 
management of the pockets of development within the oPt. On the other hand, what makes 
decentralization so valuable to the MEPP is that its implementation does not infringe on Israel’s 
security concerns. To demonstrate, the blockades on the main roads and commercial centers in Gaza 
are restricting the movement of goods, natural resources, and materials from coming into regions that 
would use them to plan development projects. As such, “98% of industries are currently not active” 
(Ben-Meir 2009:10). By contrast, decentralization in Gaza would focus development in local village 
and disperse the projects, making it difficult for Israel to target a localized bustling area. However, if 
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such a development is to take place in such a structural level, the process has to be protected against 
aggression by Israel.  
The lack of accountability surrounding the violations of IHL and IHRL in these strategies is 
partially related to the domestic judicial process in the oPt. Whether it be in the form of damage to 
Palestinian houses and vehicles, threats, intimidation, harassments, vandalism, or even setting fire to 
Palestinian farms, extremist settlers rarely face prosecution by the Israeli judicial authoritiesxi. 
Complementarily, the IDF’s arbitrary arrests of Palestinians and its denying the right to due process 
by holding them without trialxii, its refusal to transfer governmental detainees outside the occupied 
territoryxiii, its improper handling of juvenile casesxiv, and even its unlawful acts of killing Palestinian 
civiliansxv go unchallenged. To combat this issue, the UN needs to invest in effective Palestinian 
security and police forces. Currently, assistance is localized around training without arming. 
Subsequently, “the PA’s security forces became professionalized, well-trained, and engaged in daily 
coordination with the Israeli counterpart….” (Tartir 2015:12). However, when coupled with the 
advanced weapons technology of Israel, the arming of the PSF only after Israeli permission 
depending on the proximity of the forces to settlements in the WB (Hunter and Jones 2006:28) 
created an asymmetrical power dynamic in which PSF was unable to both counter the settler violence 
and to face the excessive use of force by the IDF. Further, the lack of power checks by the PA on the 
existing PSF played into a police state in which the PSF became partisan, suppressed the freedom of 
speech of Palestinian neighborhoods, “[failed] to protect the foundation of a Palestinian democratic 
system, and [even sustained] the occupation through their sub-contractor role that protected Israeli 
security” (Tartir 2015:12). To combat these problems, the UN needs to deploy a Peacekeeping 
Mission in the oPt to non-militarily monitor the [non]compliance of international agreements by all 
parties involved, to strengthen the police institutions in the WB, and to serve as buffer. While this 
team will not focus on the development of Palestine, it will bring to humanitarian aid a new 
dimension that has gone unexplored, especially in the area of human rights protection.  
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Diplomacy in the Occupied Territories: Non-Conventional Actors  
These introduced strategies involve a highl level of commitment on the part of the donor 
UN member states, which will have to not only export a significant level of man power, funds, 
and resources to the oPt, but also reshape its foreign policy platform. To guarantee that the UN 
operations can continue under a long-term model rather than having to reapply for assistance, the 
UN has to complement its domestic missions in the oPt, To do so, it needs to strategize its 
diplomatic platform, primarily by reevaluating the value of its most influential member states, 
the EU and the US, in furthering the peace process. Reformed diplomacy should first and 
foremost focus on Palestine’s partnership with Egypt, who has been a historical mediator of 
conflicts between Hamas and Israel. In the recent decades, Egypt has publicly supported 
Palestine while maintaining a private relationship with Israel in trade. However, “under the new 
leadership of Abdel Fatah el-Sissi, there appeared to have been a shift towards outright 
opposition to Hamas” (Taylor 2014) driven by Egypt’s opposition to Islamist parties, and by 
Hamas’ origins in the Muslim Brotherhood [MB]. Driven by this foreign policy, Egypt has 
maintained a military blockade in the Rafah crossing since 2007 as protection against Hamas, 
and shut down the smuggling route in 2014, closing a major channel through which Palestinians 
used to import food, raw elements, agricultural equipment, and construction material (OCHA 
locked movement 2017). A reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, and the subsequent 
abolition of armed conflict by the latter entity has the potential to facilitate negotiations with 
Egypt to lift the blockade or at least ease the restrictions on travel and transportation. Further, 
following a settlement between Fatah and Hamas, Egypt can increase the cap on its energy 
supply to Gaza. in return for alleviating the urgent crisis, Egypt will be reinstating its influence in 
the progression of the negotiations, which is in Egypt’s interests given the recent discussions by 
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the West to reanimate the negotiations after China announced its intention to be more active in 
the peace process. Although Egypt’s taking a more favorable position to Palestine is contingent 
on Hamas’ changing its most essential structure, incremental confidence-building steps can still 
be taken, especially since Egypt and Hamas has agreed this past February to a freer flow of 
goods through the Rafah crossing (Staff 2018).  
Expanding scope of analysis, a strong regional player in the conflict is the Gulf 
Cooperation Council [GCC]; Qatar, the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Saudi Arabia in 
particular have strong ties to the region. While the GCC has never been actively involved in 
negotiation processes, their recent policy platforms concerning religious extremism and Islamist 
parties like the MB are pushing the three states to reshape their partnerships with Palestine. On 
the one hand, Saudi Arabia’s priority is reclaiming international legitimacy by positioning itself 
as a bastion against Daesh and terrorism. So, “in order to legitimize its efforts in the fight against 
terrorism, it has identified with the American, European, and Israeli views on the Palestinian 
issue” (Hannieh 2018), labeling Hamas as a terrorist organization even though its military 
operations have never gone beyond the oPt. Similarly, the UAE has a history of fighting against 
domestic Islamist movements. While it has pledged $41 million to the reconstruction of Gaza, its 
support of Saudi Arabia and Egypt against the MB, and its increasing desire to align with US 
policy are minimizing its support of both Hamas and the Palestinian Government (Taylor 2014). 
Further, as an Islamist government, Qatar remains to be Hamas’ main financial backer, and 
combined with Qatar’s current isolated status within the GCC, this is giving Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE an additional reason to stay off of Palestinian politics. Likewise, Iran’s call for the 
rearming of Hamas (2014) does not sit well with the Gulf states. On the other hand, Saudi 
Arabia, the UAE, and Israel have since the 1990s built a strategic partnership of “technocratic 
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cooperation related to shared concern over a critical resource namely water desalination” (Baker 
Institute 2014: 5). When combined with the Arabic identities of the GCC states, this relationship 
facilitates its perception of neutrality, and has strengthened is role as a mediator of conflict. The 
Middle East Desalination Research Center [MEDRC] is a testament to this condition, since it not 
only “brought together Arab states, the PA, and Israel to develop practical solutions to regional 
water challenges”, but the GCC’s grounding the MEDRC has allowed it to survive throughout 
the hostilities and the ever=changing political climate until it became the only operating 
organization from Oslo (Baker Institute2014: 5). The GCC is aware of the soft power it can yield 
to influence Israeli policy, as evidenced by the Arab Peace Initiative launched by Saudi Arabia in 
2002 and sanctioned by the Arab Leaguexvi. In fact, this influence is what pushed the US to 
reinvigorate the MEPP and put American leadership back in the map, while also recognizing the 
value of the Gulf in outreach. So, a UN that invests in the GCC will also help put the US back on 
the map.  
While the GCC has substantial interest in the diplomatic process, Palestine has to take 
certain measures to increase the likelihood that Palestinian interests will align with those of 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The agreement between Fatah and Hamas is most crucial here for 
two reasons. For one, Hamas’ abandoning armed strategies will facilitate the process by which 
the GCC whitelists Hamas and opens a line of communication. Secondly, having a unified policy 
will create a stronger front when sitting down with states who will have particular visions for 
how the negotiations should proceed. Secondly, there needs to take place reconciliation between 
the Palestinian population and those of the Gulf states to rebuild the trust lost when Palestine 
publicly supported Saddam Hussein during the invasion of Kuwait. Thirdly, to balance the 
economic benefits Israel can offer to the GCC, Palestinian ought to leverage their professional 
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and educational skills, which will be improved with the reformed development strategies, to 
offer the GCC labor supply by individuals who generally share the same language, cultural 
identity and historical heritage.   
In today’s globalized word, no conflict in the Middle East is localized, but rather projects 
social, economic, and political changes to the domestic and foreign policies of states miles and 
oceans away from ground zero. The popularization of humanitarianism since the end of the Cold 
War further means that any state who keeps its distance from human rights crises impossible 
incurs costs in its reputation and influence in the international arena. Still, throughout the 20th 
century, the global dimension of the Palestinian conflict has been centralized around the Western 
civilizations, namely the US and the EU, while non-Western UN member states have stayed 
relatively isolationist. Looking at the West’s stagnated approach to the oPt, as well as at the 
emerging East who is expanding its foreign policy scope, the MEPP ought to consider the role 
historically non-conventional actors can play from 2018 on. For one, Japan can be a strategic 
player. Since 2006, Japan has pursued in the oPt a peace corridor, which facilitates the 
cooperation between Palestine, Israel, and Jordan in collective developing the private sector, 
streamlining the transportation of goods and services, and investing in public enterprises to 
achieve sustainable economic development; the idea is that through economic cooperation, 
strengthened relationships between the three entities will foster political collaboration 
(Government of Japan 2006). This project is especially significant now that it has gained 
momentum in the past few yearsxvii, which provides Japan with an financial in to the regional 
political platform. More importantly, Japan carries no cultural, political, or social ties to the 
conflict, and is concerned with having economic capital. Therefore, its taking up the mantle of 
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mediator will help isolate the economics of the oPt from its politics and build Palestinian society 
whose self-sustainability is not contingent on negotiation outcomes.  
Complementing the fiscal dimension, a diplomatic coalition with China carries potential 
in approaching the MEPP from a new perspective. From a geoeconomic perspective, “as a key 
state along China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative, Israel’s unique geographic location, stable 
political and social order, as well as advanced technology are vital for China’s successful 
economic involvement in the Middle East” (Jin 2017). Beyond prospective partnerships, 
however, China already has established relations through trade contracts in weaponry, scientific 
knowledge, “agriculture, solar energy, information and communications, as well as construction” 
(Rabkin 2013: 13). Socially, the two states enjoy a substantial level of trust built on a historical, 
reliable friendship since China’s helping Jewish refugees and immigrants in World War 2. So, 
building on these socio-economic ties, China can use Israel not only to gain a competitive edge 
in the global world order, by modernizing in areas whose supplies are increasingly in high-
demand, but also to construct a virtual bridge between the East and the West. On the other hand, 
Israel is an undeniable friend of the US, whose rivalry with China might push the latter the 
sponsor Palestine. More importantly, driven by geopolitical strategies, one of China’s biggest 
priorities is to gain a foothold in the oil-rich Middle East, and it needs soft power to do so. 
Therefore, if China is to build a favorable reputation with Arab and Muslim states, it needs to 
side with the oppressed and the colonized. Given these push-and-pull factors, China is most 
likely to follow a neutral role without overt support for either side. Given the excessively pro-
Israeli stand the US has taken under Trump’s administration and the political backlash it has 
received from not just the Palestinians and the Arab World, but also the EU, this neutrality 
makes China worthy alternative to US-led peace negotiations.  
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Although there is merit in the argument that China is not interested in the complex 
political affairs of the Middle East, recent events demonstrate otherwise. For one, China 
approved the UNSC 2334, which denounced the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East 
Jerusalem, which it recognized as Palestinian territory (UNSC 2016). Then, on August 2017, 
China introduced its “4-point Peace Plan” to facilitate the implementation of the Resolution; 
under this framework, it expressed the value of each of its partnerships with Israel and Palestine 
for its Belt Road Initiative, and proposed a “China, Palestinian, Israeli tripartite dialogue 
mechanism to coordinate the implementation of major assistance programs in Palestine” (Keinon 
2017). This strategy of peace through integration puts China in a position of arbitrator of conflict 
when economic issues carry over to political discussions. In fact, such a transition may have 
already begun to occur, since, China has vowed to take a politically active role in the MEPP as of 
December 2017xviii. Combined with China’s explicit support of the 2-state solution that rests on 
the 1967 territory linesxix, the strategic power China holds with Israel shows promise in 
rehabilitating Palestine. This statement is particularly significant given the power dynamics at 
play, since an increased Chinese presence in the region will surely push the US to reestablish its 
central position within the peace talks, reviving the process and even reconsidering its approach 
to the Palestinian demands. Given the power China and Japan holds, the UN should lean into its 
non-Western member states rather than pushing for support by traditional actors.  
Conclusion  
 
The international humanitarian frame has come to regard the Palestinians as victims in need of 
constant help, dismissing their political agency. The subsequent downpour of humanitarian aid to 
assist the areas in need of absolute assistance – such as the energy sector, hospitals, schools, or 
sanitation – meant that the structural realities driving these crises in the first place have gone 
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unchallenged and entrenched themselves in the oPt. To face this failure, there needs to be a shift 
back to development that involves the Palestinian populations in the decision-making process, 
instead of isolating them to the receiving end of foreign assistance. There needs to take place 
serious levels of civic empowerment, which can take place either through foreign NGO 
partnerships with CBOs, or through the funding and training of CSOs by the PA and Hamas. 
Secondly, a reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah following Hamas’ abandoning of its violent 
platform, and a subsequent partition of governmental responsibilities between the two entities 
depending on their perceived strengths and weaknesses is crucial to creating a united front. This 
settlement between a political Fatah and a social Hamas, where the economic dimension is 
handled by a coalition of both entities, has domestic benefits, since part of the crisis observed in 
the oPt is the economic stagnation and unemployment driven by a paralyzed administration. 
Before jumpstarting the MEPP, the UN should facilitate negotiations between Fatah and Hamas, 
which will build confidence, help restore the UN’s credibility in Palestine, and help the MEPP 
gain momentum. Thirdly, to guarantee the long-term viability of these socio-political changes, 
the security of Palestinians should match that of Israel. the UN can undertake this project either 
through reform of the PSF or by deploying a peacekeeping mission.  
Complementing domestic development within the oPt is revamped UN diplomacy 
abroad. On the one hand, the West still has a role to play in the MEPP. For one, it needs to 
reestablish its soft power by lifting its no contact policy with Hamas. While Hamas’ use of 
violent strategies to challenge Israel in Gaza give merit to the decision by the US and the EU to 
enlist Hamas as a terrorist organization, having an open line of communication with entities on 
the terrorist list is relatively common. Therefore, refusing to sit at the same table, and rather 
speaking through messengers such as Switzerland, is not only making the peace process more 
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arduous, but it is also discrediting the West in the eyes of the Palestinians, who have freely and 
democratically chosen Hamas to represent their interests abroad. Secondly, before the EU 
engages with the MEPP, the member states who have been historically involved in the region 
through their cultural, trade, investment, and political ties (France, Germany, the UK) need to 
establish a unified platform; pursuing individual interests without a coherent long-term vision is 
causing the institutional capacity of Palestine to be depending on foreign aid, as showcased by 
the UNRWA’s transition into a de-facto government in absence of Palestinian administration that 
could replace its educational and medical operations. On the other hand, there is great promise in 
expanding the MEPP to non-Western actors, namely China, and Japan. All these three states can 
use the conflict as a foothold through which they can become influential players, increasing their 
global status. Complementarily, the re-involvement of Gulf States in the conflict, which would 
be contingent on Hamas’ abandoning of arms, will give Palestine a cultural Arab ally at the table. 
The financial support all these three players can offer in the development of the oPt is also 
crucial in sustaining Palestine throughout the negotiations. 
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Endnotes  
                                                 
i The current demand is 450 million watts per day. By contrast, the energy supply since 2006 has fluctuated 
around 210 million watts [MW]. Of this 210 million watts, 120MW is provided by Israel, while the Israeli 
strikes to the Gaza Power Plant [GPP] accounts for only 60 MW since the Israeli strikes to the plant in 2006 
reduced its capacity by half. (UN Country Team 2017:18) 
ii The restricted movement of construction materials makes it difficult to build large-scale desalination 
facilities. Relatedly, the restrictions on access to the building site and on the delivery of equipment has 
delayed the erection of the Northern Gaza Emergency Sewage Treatment Plant, which was planned to start 
operating by 2012. (UN Country Team 2017: 20) 
iii In Gaza, “the rising burden of non-communicable diseases has resulted in increased and unmet needs for 
prevention and treatment measures, while tertiary healthcare services in Gaza lag behind the standard 
expected in the region” (WHO 2018:23). In response, while the Minister of Health referrals of patients to the 
WB have tripled since 2006, Israel’s permit approvals for patients have dropped from 90% to 62% (WHO 
2018:24).  
iv In 1997, the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron between Israel and the PLO gave 80% of 
Hebron city to the PA and the rest, came to be known as H2, to Israel. Under this division, 30% of Palestinians 
in H2 live adjacent to the 4 Israeli settlements in the designated 20%. Within the Salaymeh and Gheith, the 2 
neighborhoods in H2 around which the fence is built, there are severe access restrictions for security, 
including streets closed off to Palestinian pedestrians, military orders that close Palestinian shops, and the 
denial of access to Palestinian customers and suppliers (OCHA – Further Restrictions 2017).  
v“Data collected by OCHA in the northern West Bank show that the yield of olive trees in the area between the 
Barrier and the Green Line has reduced by approximately 65 per cent in comparison with equivalent trees in areas 
accessible all year round” (OCHA Impact of barrier 2017).  
vi Between July 2016 and June 2017, the parliament approved more than 2000 new housing units for Israeli 
setttlers in the WB. Although this an 18% decrease from last years statistics, “Israeli authorities approved 
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plans for 85% more housing units in the first half of 2017 than all of 2016 (OCHA increase in settler violence 
2017).  
vii During the first 2 months of 2018 alone, Israel has demolished 34 structures in the West Bank, compared to 
35 structures targeted during the whole of 2017. Comparably, Israel has approved of 36 demolitions in EJ, 
making the 2-month plan the highest rate of demolition in on its own since 2000 (OCHA West Bank 
Demolitions 2018).   
viii “what [the EU] has seen is that Israel regularly confiscates or demolishes EU-funded projects. Sometimes, it 
even seems to be in retaliation – if the EU comes out and strengthens its policy against Israeli settlements or 
does something Israel finds disagreeable, then you see a slight ramping up of demolitions or confiscations of 
EU-funded projects as if Israeli authorities purposely go for buildings with EU flags” (Lovatt Personal 
Encounter 8 March 2018).  
ix One can even argue that the focus of the IC’s financial support since the 2014 conflict has had no influence in 
Gazan economic development, since Gaza has observed a “50-60% decline in terms of capital assets, 
production and sales, employment and exports, compared to pre-2014 levels” (UN Country Team 2017:15). 
x “in 2012, the UN projected an annual growth rate of real GDP per capita in Gaza of -.6-1.5%, or even as high 
as 5.7-6.6% if a significant easing of trade and other restrictions were to take place. Since then, real GDP per 
capita in Gaza has instead decreased.” (UN Country Team 2017: 3) As the financial discrepancy shows, Israel’s 
frequently changing the extent of the blockade is preventing the IC from creating a coherent humanitarian 
plan based on stable data on the ground.  
xi “Between 2013 and 2016, the police closed 91.8% of cases of reported settler violence against Palestinians 
persons and property) (HRW 2018). 
xii “As of November 1 2017, Israeli authorities incarcerated 6,154 inmates on what they consider security 
grounds, the overwhelming majority Palestinian … held without charge or trial” (HRW 2018). 
xiii “As of October 2017, Israel [had] 453 Palestinian administrative detainees without charge or trial in Israel” 
(HRW 2018).  
xiv The IDF “arrests Palestinian children … often using unnecessary force, questions them without a family 
member present, and makes the sign confessions in Hebrew, which most do not understand. [Further] it tries 
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the majority of the detained children in military courts, which have a near-100% conviction rate” (HRW 
2018). 
xv “Between January 1st and November 6th, 2017, Israeli security forces killed 62 Palestinians, including 14 
children, and injured at least 3,494 Palestinians in the WB, Gaza, and Israel, including protestors” (HRW 
2018).  
xvi With this project, the GCC offered “full diplomatic and trade normalization for Israel with virtually the 
entire Arab and Muslim worlds as a major additional benefit to be acquired upon the conclusion of a peace 
agreement with the Palestinians” (Ibish 2017).  
xvii In September 2016, Israel added $50 million to the project to generate capital in Area A and strengthen 
Israel’s trade ties with Palestinians (Lazaroff 2016). Then, on March 2018, “Japan and Jordan have affirmed 
they will keep working on a four-way development project intended to create a path toward peace between 
the Israelis and Palestinians” (Kyodo 2018).  
xviii Gong Xiasheng, China’s envoy on the Middle East, stated that “From now on, China will continue to pay 
attention to the Palestine-Israel situation, actively participate in the IC’s endeavors in advancing peace talks 
and negotiations, support and push forward the MEPS and play an active role in advancing the 
comprehensive, just, and lasting settlement of the Palestine-Israel issue at an early date” (Gao 2017).  
xix In a  public statement, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that ‘China’s stance is clear and we 
have always upheld our claim – that is, we support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that 
enjoys full sovereignty, with East Jerusalem as its capital and based on the 1967 border” (Gao 2017).  
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Abbreviation List 
CBOs = Community Based Organizations 
CSOs = Civil Society Organizations 
EC = European Commission  
EJ = East Jerusalem  
EU = European Union  
GA = General Assembly  
GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council 
GL = Green Line  
GPP = Gaza Power Plant  
GS = Gaza Strip  
HRW = Human Rights Watch  
IC = International Community  
ICRC = International Committee of the Red 
Cross  
IDF = Israeli Defense Forces 
IHL = International Humanitarian Law  
IHRL = International Human Rights Law  
IRC = International Relief Committee  
MB = Muslim Brotherhood 
MENA = Middle East North Africa  
MEPP = Middle East Peace Process 
NSAs = Non-State Actors   
OCHA = Office of the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs  
oPt = Occupied Palestinian territories  
PA = Palestinian Authority  
PLC = Palestinian Legislative Council 
PLO = Palestinian Liberation Organization 
PNA = Palestinian National Authority  
PSF = Palestinian Security Forces 
TSCA = Temporary Shelter Cash Assistance 
UAE = United Arab Emirates  
UN = United Nations 
UNCCP = UN Conciliation Commission in 
Palestine 
UNHCR = UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
UNICEF = UN International Children’s 
Education Fund 
UNSC = United Nations Security Council  
US = United States  
WB = West Bank  
WBEJ = West Bank and East Jerusalem 
WBGS = West Bank and Gaza Strip 
WHO = World Health Organization 
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